


# Gnomon Knows

Conditional Critique angst and against AAF("against affective formalism of Cronan)

Edwin VanGorder







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
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### Topological Notes

Meaning must be manifold or we would not be discussing it. The topology of ontology is a paradox, for every layer one wishes to extricate or subtract the effort adds a new layer. Transparency in relation to an osmotic consciousness serves to differentiate simulacrae and simultaneity.



Conditionality of a hardworking Matrix of Maggi:

Transparency Through the Litany

Aletia anon

Recoiling Medusa

Asinininit y of the assignation

Torpors and Torus ot the topologies of the Tropic of Trope

Res Entropy

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
Reluctant Host and Report of the Flea

Excavations Progress'In advance of the Therapeutic Silence

Terrability Firmanent

Skrrs of Lesions of experience

Gnomon Knows





## **EPILOGON : THE STRUCTURE OF THIS JOURNAL**

Dasein- thereness: Time simultaneous- reflexive reflective //.> Deixis: Space= simulacrae->labyrinthine

Together time and space are amalgama or zones which bend each other and configuration to consciousness conforms to a simultaneous motion between object as ego derived and libido given to accomplish what is called information or concept pattern . Deixis or the construct as configuration of a circumstance in order to see are simulacrae, nor is it simultaneous, ie the sun rises over the north and south poles to accomplish day as a simulacra but not simultaneously.

The trajectory is one of the throwness of happenstance out of which symbolic chaos its paradox emerges free of dualisms.


Identifying Magic of the Majoi or Pre-PreSocratics: Primordial Chaos identified of human agency towards electing and selecting potency and potential.

Chaos : the account itself as in advance of the therapeutic silence.



Identifying the objects of Consciousness' (are) philosophic bracket  
(as)

Reserving phenomenological reading to semiotic conditional present  
(neutral epiphenomenology) of thereness thisness and suchness.





/: ( I think) modernism must represent itself to be consistent, by changing- the rhea mod of res-present is just that (a splintering), more than a framing, rather, the multitude of associative gradients which defeat thereby the singularity of that which is then paradoxically called representation, the philosophic bracket opens up time itself as that which conditions mere circumstance, as would be the case of representation served whole , the presentation is an altering of presence as shared not between an article and its paradigms but rather of presence of the immaterial present. The material is ego differentiated through a reading process of that ego upon itself which is the nature of semeiotics upon the somatic or bodily present, the material of which is within the scope of gradients of physical and psychological colloids determinative of the reading itself are then as phenomenal and the phenomenologically presencing then the morphogenetic principle within its variations mark this dimension of fluidity, as also are the necessary derivations such as are conceit, trope topological projection of levels of meaning as configured to facultative assimilation ergo in the broadness of scope, thereby substantially immaterial to give a Hegelian antiptosis.



In contrast to this Cronan is saying a reality principle in art outside the principles it only shares as within reality cannot be spoken of. To be spoken of the very creation must be, according to his lights, a matter of principle not mechanically transmitted as the directives of the suddenly real but rather an osmotic assimilation within the reading structure of consciousness itself which uses cues not to manufacture, but to construct, these as brought to view variously in the cognition process are the time of creative appraisal he marks representative of all that leverage.

These two versions, his and mine seem then to both share the dimension of flux, where we differ perhaps is in what we respectively would term Not-flux.

We agree that Matisse was concerned with the difficulty of presenting ones self to another, he did not have the kind of confidence Picasso had that every mark he made worked, rather he struggled them out through systematic rejections... or so it would seem, I think actually Picasso's drawing mode was a code that could only exist by destroying itself and becoming something new in the moment. That is to say, an emblematic problematic of the psychological "drive". Tod Cronan states "it would be hard to imagine a set of arguments beyond the empirical analysis of the eye (page 3 here- I am going to go through this book page by page ) Empirical evidence requires the validity of definitions, whereas language itself is not definitive but associative and etymological. What he finds hard to imagine is what he finds outside the flux of meaningful events that have a yes or no answer: thus Matisse decides – it works or it does not work.. I find the word Event to relay and rely on a different code, I say Matisse was not decisive-never decided but only preferred. The sequence of these consecutive stages may seem to be the absolute paradigm of the empirical eye... but empiricism has always foundered on not recognizing semeiotic reading, Matisse read via Cezanne and Rodin but in his way he also resisted these readings and revolted against the implicit empiricism of following masters towards a goal, rather he kept the reading but abandoned the goal. Although Cronan cites the constant frames doors and patterns as the structure of a vision towards such empirical building he is more perceptive when he remarks of Matisse of the Chapel of the Rosary that he moved from tableau to environment. Thus in his way Matisse arrived precociously at the philosophic adjustment from framing or bracketing towards instead the post deixis realm of Semeiotic Blending, or Niche as it is starting to occur to us today.

<https://youtu.be/bc8LKIRUJhQ> (<https://youtu.be/bc8LKIRUJhQ>)

Against :**Against Affective Formalism** continued" ( I am against it but then again...)

/:2) refers to oscillation per Bois page 5: nodes psychological( meaning monads) and Berenson "cause our faculty of perception to oscillate" Cronan: rephrasing Kant- the conditions of experience are simultaneously the conditions of the objects of experience" for him = for both authors this perceptual effect, while it emerges within a representational setting, is the condition for representation itself>

My agreement and disagreement is that what is meant is simulacrae and the classical preclassical understanding of this "statue" as meaning status and states- metamorphosis on the lights of the "altering "of alters as herms as foreshadowing the "hermeneutical" Correspondingly representation and configuration as an osmotic re-presencing afforded apperceptive cognition is towards effectuating affect rather than affecting effect and diegetic rather than mimetic. Representation distributed to a

diegetic principle differs from mimesis and thus indicates that by which the objects of experience can not be assumed to be thus mimetic *as though by definition* although, paradoxically they relate to pattern at the level of conflating signifier and signified as the conditions of sublection by which the ego must reflect on itself to direct its ongoing discourse, or intentions into semiotic array as laurel of the aural and auriation.

The meaning of psychological nodes and philosophic monads are to create a leverage beyond simple transpose into a space time continuum beyond the realm of dualism, thus monad is the efficacy of monism at levels of psychological colloids informed by the ego involvement in I-image (I-majjoi or magistrate) I-magi /:and Immediate- I – mediate as sublection taken to cognitive apperception at integrative level therefore configuration over representation as the difference linked to rhetoric as structuring Aristotelian categories towards discourse and hence the somatic levels of the semiotic reading of phenomenology.

Thus Cronan takes up these threads on this level: “For both Bois and Bergson this causal encounter with line and color produces traumatic effects destabilizing putatively classical modes of representation and the normative selfhood that sustains it. What the traumatic experience of one’s suppressed bodily setting reveals is the “intentional nature of the Perceptual field”. The disoriented perceiver comes to know the constructed and ideological nature- that is what “intentional” means in Bois’s phrase- of his seemingly transparent reality. Once again it is not that Bois denies the status of representation- far from it; traumatic effects occur within a representational setting that can never be open to dispute. Or rather the disagreement about cause and effect, what actually happens to the beholder, differ from what a work means or how we interpret what happens.”.

Firstly: traumatic means overdetermination, the suppression of metonymy, or the morphogenic structuring of psyche as its own ongoing presentation of its self upon which are configured the sense of potency, and value of the thus constructed experience as communicative of a give and take of consciousness. Thus Cronan approaches intention, construct and idea are meta levels in the work of art which play with the viewers expectations by offering redirection, thus for Cronan this redirection must be a pattern by which the viewer recognizes their own over determinations or putative normalcy, the work therefore is a kind of reputation he calls representation on the strength of its refutation or invitation towards a deeper immersion.

All well and good to my lights... yet phenomenon as a flaring out as he constructs it here requires a reading, a semiotic, and this reading keeps changing- we read the objects of art history within a continual transformation of res-presencing- but is re-presencing the same as representing, or is the term configuring more apt because it indicates the bodily environment of the “suppressed bodily setting”? In that case it becomes more like architecture, something built around Lacan’s Lacunae of “nothing”, an empty center, the threads of narrative which accumulate without recognizing chance and thereby missing something of fate fortune and the luck of intuition as it were become an interference pattern of “representation” Cronan essentially believes abstraction is a process of mediation within the viewers field as bridged, rather than an automatic state of “abstraction”. Thus “abstract” art is actually cognitively determined into a state of abstract realization. The “rhea” mode is what is what I notice

makes topography rather than mimesis the structure of consciousness. A donut and a coffee cup are topologically, abstractly the same, but in no way mimic each other... and the consciousness accordingly is diegetic rather than mimetic, but then again not in the realm either of diexis or context formulations of dualism defining dialectic.

Page 6- not abstract of figurative but object and work of art ( his general idea is art as a guided shared subjectivity) represent means a duality of work of art and world outside, difference between art object and any object in the reading towards meaning over and beyond sense persuasion.

3- the idea of psychic nodes Cronan observes in Bois is a recycling of the Leibnitzetean nomadic “monad” by which monism is marked to psychological and physical colloids intercepting, forming, and informing each other. He (Cronan) prefers to distinguish however, chiefly between art and non art, how the art object then can be said to direct a shared subjectivity that in a general way reflects what could be called the artists intention, thus of this agency he looks to inform more deeply a sense of such constitution, as in the Hanseatic League, he is in league with a kind of barter, in which therefore a kind of record is sought through that deemed the “meaning “ or worth... similarly, the philosophers he is informed by, Kant and Hegel as stated at outset, were identified with the Aestheticism movement (one associates with Whistler or David Caspar Freidrich perhaps to the degree the latter thinks in terms of “sigla” created within his works symbolizing the work, i.e. the works own self image)...

Inside and outside art invites however, the dualism that plagues dialectics. Can it fly? The idea of dialectic has had many permutations, the real and ideal) Plato) the incidence of Monism and Flux (NeoPlatonists), The structure of discourse (Aristotle), thesis and anti thesis- Hegel, and the relation of apperception to the construction of experience with Kant, underwriting and over writing with Lacan and Objet B as journalistic, and identification of trope to entropy within overwriting per Smithson, as well then as the current semeiotic niche or blending by which a Marxist sense of capital is rerouted to creative capital via the way creatures use their environments as reinforcing interspecies evolution as a signifying towards creative capital as a topology as well as Deleuze’s interest in a morphogenic deterritorialization...cousin perhaps to interests in topology...as a kind of anti Structuralism... (mirroring but inverse image like trope and entropy) Along the way cubism with intersection union and opposition gave a kind of set theory we are familiar with as Boolean sets: information architecture.. Hegel gives the view of ego as determining motion towards and away an object creating a subject (reflection of Greek language in general) and in the determining Kant amplifies the aperception and the nature of experience creating itself through the opening out of it’s inquiry, whereas Hegel focused on thesis and antithesis or the qualitative coinformation process. Much of the current interest in a psychologisation of philosophy rhymes with physics in that both approach rhetoric in the sense of semiotics as the reading of phenomenology and these currents from the PreSocratic experience of relating human culture to natural events was preceded by the influences of the Persians, Egyptians and Zarathustrans in which the potency of events over various fields available to human perception are taken deeper into the process of actually perceiving. Thus “magic” is the early form of rational thinking, paradoxically...

Along with these many threads of dialectic there is the whole interdisciplinary will to plethora and panoply- music, theatre,dance, film,advanced media, sculpture,music, art, architecture,design, etc...

So where do we approach the inside and outside of a determinative field?

Cronan is careful to not try to answer this all at once, and since we are only on page 6 I will indicate some of the books motions: P7- indicates representation as meaning the liveliness of informing the process of signs rather than representation itself as a code or index. For Matisse is a paradox, his works are very idea oriented even schematic, yet identified with maximum sensation, an artist of both idea and process: he sees Matisse as invoking abstraction yet in the end working away from any signification devoid of the artists argument, he makes the work a pathos, an apologia of its own means of self confrontation. Therefore the difference is like that of pattern and ornament, pattern is representation to our modes of actually perceiving while ornament is the loss of attention. The matter of representation as meaning something like Ohm's rhea mode: holding something up to view again, levant as crux of the then relevant or rhea-lized... (Wholeness and the Implicate Order)

In this way Cronan defines Representation as virtually "implicate". The Antithesis for him is then what he calls "affective" conduct- assigning value automatically to a procedure process, thing or event. The process of assigning values he instead gives over to something like the rhetoric's, multiple levels of approach except that he tends to approach cognitive process on a more singular plane the monolithic process.

For me the difference has to do with the relation to semeiotics, which he identifies, like art and non art as pertaining to a kind of dualism of what is and what is not , inside and outside, art and non art, and Cronan ascribes to Matisse the interest in a view of conditionality within intentions different than the psychological immersions of pathos at extreme levels. So where else is the animus, then of signifiers,? For the Greeks the word bios meant both bow, and life, is the animus affective as in the mechanics of the bow, or does the lyre, art, touch upon a different compulsion? By viewing semiotics as reading the transcript;tion between an outside and an inside I feel Cronan abandons the premises o f his very view point as described because one arrives at a mere amassing of "updates" of the process in progress, rather than following a morphogenic meander proper.

In today's term: does an artwork become invested with what becomes its artificial intelligence by which it now alone but informed provides the rationales or morphological arrows directive of meaning through the substantiality of its arrival to perception as the base thereby of experience it generates ?

In other parts of the book the them of hypnotism as it interested the ethos and artists of Maltose's time is detailed in very provocative terms. After all, for them this was a kind of (as I see it) artificial intelligence, the subject, reduced to an automaton yet delves into consciousness, is "affective"

Habitat, habituation, and habit: If language is in and of itself akind of three dimensional art of transference ( as I see it)- and comes across space person to person and if the structure has a hidden nature that reveals itself unpredictably one could ,surprisingly for Einstein, say it possible do the same thing the same way and still get new results (jazz) , while to do new things in an old way or old in a new or new in a new are after all mere formulas after a while... I only mention this to describe the difficulties

of representation in terms of realizing some external state to an internal or vice versa per dialectical dualism. With Leonard drawing as a semiotic across both science and art wreaks the magic of perception. Perhaps Matisse also tangled these chords to a sense of complex for which his simplicity as idea was tonic.

I agree with Cronan that too much power is ceded the viewer to establish meaning arbitrarily by studying some efficacy wrought upon them or then again the willful construct of meaning lost to a kind of ornamentation... I disagree that semiotics manage an interior and exterior world as mediation and instead see semiotics as the in fact phenomenal hinted at by Leibnitz and the PreSocratics and elaborated by Deleuze in rather artistic term

Page 9 animal-Bergs: acted rather than thought- thus “affective”( least attractive of Roman's presentations). Habit...animal- lives and acts rather than represents...( sounds attractive- what is the status then of animus in relation to pathos?-page 10 Bergs we are acted rather than acting ourselves- contrast to Heidegger and Greek consciousness as osmotic...Bergson...”self possessed”... thus the subconscious rather than the structure of metonymy is considered uninformed(by reflection)

In contrast: Heraclitus and battlement: i.e. actions balance themselves, consider, integrate within their very moment... i.e. think of Yokohama’s razor- why needlessly duplicate perception if fluidity is a kind of perception...?

Discourse, change of intention (as change not of intention but rather within intention to push a certain direction to its showing, that it will show something. The idea of autonomy gives a transference of animus, transference in the psychological sense of muttomy, phronesis, valences of transformation with in the formative as it relates to its moment and its rhythm.

Cronan Laps some edges: Bergson on animal consciousness a acting and living rather than representing( oddly attractive->question: how do animus and pathos meet ethos/.. Duchamp on “transference as expression i.e. a kind of manufactured and distributed state ( note different meaning of “transference in psychology which has opposite connotation of metonymy).also Cronan mentions availability of discourse as a typical notion of representation which does not interest him.

So what I am seeing here is the strangeness of relating biological identification and the subconscious alike as dead ends or mere ornamentation of the creative as recreation so to speak or as to broach representation, on the one hand, yet on the other the subconscious may be considered the very formative drive, transference the varying of levels which as such reprsresent in an unexpected dimension of (that) very idea... and the difference seems to be that of discourse as an explosion rather than a prediction out of which the motions that visualize are like living as though acted upon rather than acting, as in The Greek sense of an osmotic primordial chaos, or then again autonomy may be that very intention to give a sign rather than declare or conceal as Herbalists describes the sibyl. What does it mean to give a sign? This is really the philosophic question as I see it.



Approaching art through ontological foundations of what an art object is Against Affective - Formalism (AAF in future references) guides to a statement of Duchamp on the gap between intention and its arrivals of modification in the work of art, Cronan critiques Duchamp as abandoning intent thereby as explanatory or even existing in the establishing of the gap or as I call it Lacunae- AAF encounter ontological difficulties associated with Structuralism, the lack of consideration of evolution when considering human ideation, yet with Vicco and his comprehension of a labyrinthine and discursive rather than Cartesian relation of human "progress" this was an early ontological aura.

AAF insists, towards its ontology, that the work of art is about the world and therefore if animated, not animal, if organic, not biological function, and that connected to apperception is a cognitive field in which for Cronan are Kantian of "the The conditions of experience are simultaneously the conditions of the objects of experience" are an Aestheticism in which the word simulacrae can be taken to indicate a guiding of shared subjectivity to a realization of the essence of the act of comparison by which associations the Structuralism of topologies are made incipient upon a mirroring process between the world and its very image out of which vision as a construct is immersive to grammars of direct and indirect intent in the principles of realization of the work of art as a work of art rather than just any object Thus the ego identification into the structures of any object as developing an ontologically derived existence give the work of art over to paradigm status. Status as a word derived of statue, as is state give voice to the artistic proof which underlies Aristotelian scientific categories in the dimensions relating ethos pathos and dialectic and statue is derived of the world simulacrae which we see in the Kantian phrase as an etymological phronesis of the evolution from magic to philosophy by which "Goetia or the base of a tableau-(sculpture indicating metamorphosis) is related to a capital, a "theuria" or higher understanding by which the mere materials and process are understood and in the shadows then of this history AAF stakes its claim and territorialization of art consciousness in which nature is not art, design is not art, human artifacts are not art, rather, art is art. Because Art for Arts sake defines Aestheticism, and Cronan is clearly and Exponent, as am I, of Aestheticism, the disagreement between us, within the sense that movements topology, has to do with the structure of topology, which I see as morphogenic. Cronan at outset identifies Deleuze, early Modernism, Mondrian with a dynamic in which art as such is subtracted from its prior claims and guided to a kind of sense of reality in and of itself, the creativity of the morphogenic discrimination is that which art may be about, but the ontology is given over to an Immanence of construct in which art is the being of being as being rather than being about anything. For AAF art is about something and that is what defines it.

At this point I return that definitions rely on language which is actually already an art construct because modes exist on multiple levels whereas definitions level the plane of experience. Cronan believes that an immersive construct mitigates against this declaration and that rather than a transparency the act of apperception adjusts consciousness through this act. Yet acting rather than thinking has been his definition of the opposite of art, and it is here, in the construction of motion movement and flux inclusive of biological factors and interspecies evolution that the relation of semeiotics, of reading can make the critique Chiller made made of Kant which is that consciousness is self produced by its own readings of sense, is wholly human, rather than partly human in contact with an ex-human immanence. On this basis then I believe the history of rhetoric planted in scientific categories all recognize discourse as the

ambiance of movement as deep flux out of which the particularities of discrimination towards art and non art must founder, all human constructs are language productions, including the concept of nature, thus it is not at all a question of art or not art, but rather the opening out process by which things are invited to visualize. Better art, as opposed to worse art, pushes the envelope by seeing what happens. It is in the end... amazingly simple and absolute grace.

Cronan states he is anti psychological in his stance, and this shows in his refusal of the psychological terms of transference which mean metonymy, and his acceptance of transference as meaning a very meaning which if not directly transposed from object to viewer comes across a cognitive field directive of an apriori meaning, something that can be said to be implicit and planted. The ontological base of this however on reflection, becomes mired in dualism and does not address on substantial terms concept of dialectic as developed outside such dualism's which fell by the side long ago with Derrida and Deleuze and yes.... The psychologisation of philosophy.

For example: I cant see the ontological apparatus constructed here around Matisse and Bergson would survive and encounter with Earth Art...( and even that was a long time ago...) yet Cronan is an editor for Nonsite.org which models Smithson, he must - therefore somehow connect site non site with his definition of representation. Smithson however used “entropy” to model trope, and the biological connectiveness of trope to language structure as semeiotic to discourse rather than definitions is part and parcel of Smithsonian's refusal of the terms of dialectic disposed to dualism...

3 Cronan in Against Affective Formalism takes Paul Valery as modelling the contradictions that interest him, creating a “structural subconscious” (as mentioned, for some reason he considers the subconscious uninformed by the conscious, awaiting form, whereas Lacan with Heidegger reverses that conclusion, however as mirrors they give the same trope or reversal of:)- per Valery as highly intentioned efforts which meeting resistance in material or at separation of author from work at which point the spectator takes over so to speak... into which discourse Cronan interjects the question of intentionality as itself an apperception which rejoins the work to itself- one can view the work as though intervening on ones self rather than one intervening on it.. so in these cycles we have a kind of canonical Hegelian consciousness.. The work does not seem to stamp a meaning on the viewer, nor the viewer on the work so how will one state meaning within all this shared subjectivity is his thematic question.

The truth of what one says or finds one might say, is not the nominal result but rather the transformation by which one has found the capacity to create the form from nothing so to speak, everything you say you say may be wrong perhaps but in the effort what you put out was some kind of something which empowers interest and is in some sense built, although exactly how when where or why may be long to the flux of perception. The bridge here actually seems Heidelberg's concept of time as otologically created in the space of becoming, in which time Is all that which is malleable.

Within these agreements towards the system he projects the term “meaning” somehow does not grab me...because all that which gives meaning is exactly that which then causes it to be found, if meaning is imparted as the word implicitly describes itself, the transaction, and Cronan uses the term legal towards

this attitude- it is what he means, i.e. identity to worth as verifiable meaning is lost in the very transaction by which it sells itself... thus the nominalist critique: you can't put things into words, yet then again that is because they are already there. So what is the difference in terms of the art object of that which is imputed implied or ascribed towards meaning, and that which is conditional to diverting layers of the words psychological construct by which it reads the consciousness that generates it? Meaning will adapt itself to any subject you give it, but these subjects are blind- so to speak, from within their justice they have no concept of meaning other than that they simple are. And reflexively are that moment now in time.

Cronan begins by arguing that a truth in the wholeness of art perception had with Modernism moved to subtract the idea of artifice and posit itself whole as very experience. He substitutes as his argument the perception;- that apperception is the pattern itself of what might be called the conditional present which belongs in art to the state suspending conscious appraisal to the dialectic of an invitational or shared subjectivity which in some sense come to terms with intuiting a source of the visualization that ensues this production as its structure in consciousness. Yet by establishing as it were on the lights of his identification to Aestheticism the artifice of art as its mode and separation from that which it is not. That artifice which can only be seen through the means of its own production yet is verifiable to a kind of truth factor of its own establishment is language itself and its semiotic reading of its etymologically diversified levels of approach in their simultaneity and simulacrae. These reading of phenomena does then for me prove all things art, yet what then is the opposite of art? The opposite of art is the sudden flattening of the levels of approach, the "specific object" is not the art, any art object taken as a totality is only a fetish, that art of the artist is overall...

#### 4: Positive and negative semiotics

Semiotics refers to reading phenomenology as that very reading the ontology.

Transparency vs arbitrariness as opposite model of dialectical paradigm: Immanence, conflux, any monistic impulse are now attributed to something these are "about"- a totality outside of the totality of signs to which they only refer or point to as informing their adjustment rather than those signs being the original information in fact. My description of semiotics as that which takes the nominalist argument that things can't be put into words only because already there receive a kind of codicil for Cronan (we are on page 18 of his Introduction to Against Affective Formalism- he states "the problem with semiotics is that it claims to relate a point of view of which man knows nothing because an "unreflecting totalization" he continues: "this position is essentially right-but it is hard to imagine its epistemological import": he means by this that one cannot make decisions about what is right or wrong.

Strangely, he casts epistemology as "the strongest form of representational available" and similar to his view... he also compares semioticians and Lacanians as sharing the view that artworks interrupt the classical modes of representation, by "setting in motion a shift from preconscious activity to a conscious one: ( in other words the view that the subconscious is the metronome of transference by which the conscious rather than describing the subconscious as its other is in fact created by the subconscious and those interruptions having to do with interpellation and interpellation between space and time.

I don't see how he squares "unreflecting totalization" with "form of representation"... but he may be offering representation as a form of configuration, which is a word which out of the rhetoric ensemble serves to mediate transgression and contingency per the interruptions mentioned...for Cronan the sticking point is "what could that "conscious activity get us that is in any way less mediated than the "subconscious" one.?

To answer this I will coin the word "epiphronesis", by which I mean the sense of rhythm, phronesis over multiple levels of associations which broach upon an expanding mutuality which in Heraclitus's description of the Sybil "neither declares nor conceals but gives a sign". Previously Cronan has sympathized in his mentioning Bergson's distaste for animal being which simply is and acts rather than thinks or means yet in declaring his need for meaning to choose right and wrong or at any rate "matter in what we do" and it is this very "acting" which he is now using as critique. For him acting reflectively means incorporating the viewer into the directedness of the work of art in such a way that the work in being incorporated as well into the viewer does not suffer the fate of being a machine of cognizant interchange but is able to parse meaning where meaning is subject to indirect definition, a state of being about, rather than a state of being compromised.

Configuration however differs from representation in that it also parses, but on the level of whatness but rather thereness and that thereness is this conditional present not of shifts of paradigm or elaborations of "context" but rather the jointwork (harmos-joint-harmony)

Which is why my work elects joinery forms as information architecture...

These are influenced by Nancy Holtz's Sun Tunnels( variations in themselves on Eileen Gray's Tube House) in which huge pipe sections in desert line up with Solstice and Equinox and holes cut receive in daylight specific starlight. They have form me a strong "Orphic" content- deterritorializing StoneHenge as it were...

### Ghost In the Machine and Epiphronesis

Epiphronesis as a word I coined is fortuitous because it is contiguous actually ; with "epiphenomenology" which holds physicality motivates mental actions while the opposite idea of rational transformation of the mental to physical: Roman's interest in the art works intentionality which he recognizes as being towards the non affective or physical and therefore a physical condition created by mental processes which are forced by other mental processes planted in materials through actions. The question of mental actions proceeding physical belongs to a variation of Zen's paradox, i.e. the philosophical exclusion principle by which each explanation is also an action, and plants that action in the

verb this the mental procedure is in constant regress ( the idea of an osmotic consciousness per Heidegger for example is meant to cope with this – and coined the idea of epiphronesis as referencing the idea of a joint- Harmos- harmony) Gilbert Rhyles idea of Ghost in the Machine would seem to reference Goetia of lower magic of materials and Theuria as higher magic of theory and idea synthesis... which as dualism he opposed and thus the “neutral epiphenomenalism of Sayre the early Artificial Intelligence pioneer working on the double hermeneutic that machine intelligence studied in turn was the study of human, produced the kind of paradox which relates to combining yet finding irreducible the principles of Monism and Dualism, his paradox then that in recognizing writing the machine ( computer)construct must confront the segmentation principle i.e. that to recognize letters they must be segmented or made reducible to parts yet in order to do this one must recognize their whole condition,, similarly Zeno observed an arrow in flight in order to move can never then be said to be in a particular place or point, and in the exclusion principle mentioned at outset. One might elaborate also towards Chinese calligraphy which formed on natural forms requires the skilled practitioner to identify into nature in order to retrieve the feeling for the now -signs. Thus the difference between natural and artificial ideas in the case of neutral epiphenomenology which is what seems most plausible to me is that the skill sets given over to practice between thought and action are only provisional and therefore not pointing at meaning as Cronan would like to indicate, but rather a sustained metamorphosis which recognizes necessity rather than compulsion.


Thus the eternal relation of paradox to philosophy is one of unconsciously relating Monism to dualism, looking for intent in relation to meaning for example is held in abeyance by “neutral epiphenomenalism” by recognizing that inserting the verb into the rationalization will disturb forever in like regression via the conditionality of the verb which does not necessarily meet its ontological bracket predicated as that is on a kind of lacunae opening out on the topologies of association. Natural ideas as cognitive thresholds are a Monistic impulse while the artifice by which meaning is constructed exists precisely because meaning is artificial, is that which is said about what is, but can only be said to be that- as the effort of speech proves this. Neutral epiphenomenalism does not attribute meaning per se, but is willing to use the construction of meaning out of interest in the transgressions to come which discover to contingency that which is held in abeyance that nothing can be said about it and yet also cannot not be said either. This is the exact opposite idea of holding words to definitions at a time, a “grammar” but rather is the thinking of etymology... The Sayrian dilemma that things require parsing to be seen whole but cannot be seen segmented without being seen whole is in a way planted in Roman's interest in the paradoxical nature of Matisse and Bergson whom he sees as enamored of an abstract, affective design of consciousness transmitted inside out from its emergent potential and inclined as I see it towards effectuating an implicate discourse. Rhetoric, as ethos pathos and dialect parses dialectic with ethos and pathos become discourse, according discourse and dialectic are simulacrae corresponding to the paradox of Monism and Dualism. This simulacrae in the early “magic” discourse of “goetian and Theurgia, or material selections towards irreducibles of unimagined power stood originally in relation the I-Maggi, and I-mediate of magic as mediation become as “mediation” central tenets to Roman's interest in mediating shared consciousness to productive ends by which “theurian” is now theoretical to critical discourse. Cronan introduces the artist as critic, the critic as artist.

Cronan is therefore concerned to state meaningfully towards the work of art, whereas I am more interested in the artist as predicate to a set of variations. Matisse said: I am not interested in things, I am interested in the difference between them.” He could of said “I am interested in doing old things in a new way and new things in an old way but it would have been a less interesting comment and ravelin.

The varies of discourse match the varieties of dialectic, dialectic is placed in rhetoric as a structure shared with ethos and pathos, altogether: that which is said- about the environment from within the environment of perception thus Kant extricates this as the” conditions of experience as simultaneously the conditions of the objects of experience’- within which “simultaneously” becomes the bracket by which modern perception and antique simulacrae share origins and becoming. The implicate order of dialectic is discourse, and discourse as the movement of that which is said in its variety becomes linked to statements assuming in language the modes of metalevels which allow a projection of meaning past the mere incidence of the present moderators verbal entry as it modifies that of which it speaks by the modification it makes on itself through the interference patterns of mood and mode upon each other in the singular present and possessive past as each relate and counter relate past assumptions of relevance.

Dialectics have included ideal and real, mood and mode, subject and object, the one and the many, flux and conflux, mimetic and diegetic, praxis and theory, Goetia and theuria, transparency and digression, sign and symbol, unity and construction, topology and morphology, transgression and contingency, natural and artificial knowledge, real and virtual, mind and brain, mind and matter, trace and rhizome; mimesis and dieresis, circumstance and event, tableau and environment, thesis and anti thesis, diexis and index and of these diads a harmonic set of triads in their implicate orders of discourse are thusly discursive to issues of identity usage and being, ethos pathos and dialectic; immersion, generativity and interactive; nominal, logical and expressive, noumenon, noema and phenomenon, semiotics semantics and epistemology, Issues Pragmatics and Projects’ topologies, deterritorialization and semiotic niche; morphology topology and topography; union intersection and opposition; segmentation. oscilation and virtuality;































































































































































































































































































































































Notes" Affective Formalism" per Tod Cronan

/: ( I think) modernism must represent itself to be consistent, by changing- the rhea mod of re-present is just that (a splintering), more than a framing, rather, the multitude of associative gradients which defeat thereby the singularity of that which is then paradoxically called representation, the philosophic bracket opens up time itself as that which conditions mere circumstance, as would be the case of representation served whole , the presentation is an altering of presence as shared not between an article and its paradigms but rather of presence of the immaterial present. The material is ego differentiated through a reading process of that ego upon itself which is the nature of semeiotics upon the somatic or bodily present, the material of which is within the scope of gradients of physical and psychological colloids determinative of the reading itself are then as phenomenal and the phenomenological presencing then the morphogenic principle within its variations which mark this dimension of fluidity, as also are the necessary derivations such as are conceit, trope topological projection of levels of meaning as configured to facultative assimilation ergo in the broadness of scope, thereby substantially immaterial to give a Hegelian antiptosis.

In contrast to this Cronan is saying a reality principle in art outside the principles it only shares as within reality cannot be spoken of . To be spoken of the very creation must be , according to his lights, a matter of principle not mechanically transmitted as the directives of the suddenly real but rather an osmotic assimilation within the reading structure of consciousness itself which uses cues not to manufacture, but to construct, these as brought to view variously in the cognition process are the time of creative appraisal he marks representative of all that leverage.

These two versions, his and mine seem then to both share the dimension of flux, where we differ perhaps is in what we respectively would term Not-flux.

We agree that Matisse was concerned with the difficulty of presenting ones self to another, he did not have the kind of confidence Picasso had that every mark he made worked, rather he struggled them out through systematic rejections... or so it would seem, I think actually Picasso's drawing mode was a code that could only exist by destroying itself and becoming something new in the moment. That is to say, an emblematic problematic of the psychological "drive". Tod Cronan states "it would be hard to imagine a set of arguments beyond the empirical analysis of the eye (page 3 here- I am going to go through this book page by page ) Empirical evidence requires the validity of definitions, whereas language itself is not definitive but associative and etymological. What he finds hard to imagine is what he finds outside the flux of meaningful events that have a yes or no answer: thus Matisse decides – it works or it does not work.. I find the word Event to relay and rely on a different code, I say Matisse was not decisive- never decided but only preferred. The sequence of these consecutive stages may seem to be the absolute paradigm of the empirical eye... but empiricism has always foundered on not recognizing semeiotic reading, Matisse read via Cezanne and Rodin but in his way he also resisted these readings and revolted against the implicit empiricism of following masters towards a goal, rather he kept the reading but abandoned the goal. Although Cronan cites the constant frames doors and patterns as the structure of a vision towards such empirical building he is more perceptive when he remarks of Matisse of the Chapel of the Rosary that he moved from tableau to environment. Thus in his way Matisse arrived precociously at the philosophic adjustment from framing or bracketing towards instead the post deixis realm of Semeiotic Blending , or Niche as it is starting to occur to us today.





























































In this drawing I am creating a thought experiment exhibition, restaging in different terms one in which the photography of Brancusi was exhibited in the Guggenheim. The idea of Brancusi's sculpture as focused on the base intrigues me as relating towards the evolution of magic to philosophy in which the term simulacrae, meaning statue per state and status of morphogenic character was in the lower region goetia, ghost as it were implicative of the artifacts of experience while the upper region of the theurgic, or theory as a kind of immersion. At a time artist often had as theme a "Brancusi show", using his style, and here I am doing something like this, using a variation on his hour glass theme . His friend, Duchamp, in the Glass similarly used a lower region and higher region, I am adding to this the use of "brackets" as suggesting the philosopher's bracket as in the essence of Goedel's theorem that any statement also refers to itself, the philosopher's bracket tends to specify that moment in the argument, ie "these" "those"- some indication of the thinkers present moment, state and status if you will..

